Part 1; Question 9
Terror Group: Islamic State or ISIS
One of the most successful terror groups of recent history is the Islamic State. The ISIS ran into success in mid-2000s, when it controlled vast portions of Iraq and Syria. It claimed it was a "caliphate," or an Islamic state. ISIS controlled about 8 million people and raked in billions of dollars each year. There were several factors that made ISIS so successful. (Ryan, 2015). One of the main reasons for ISIS's success was its utilization of political instability in Iraq and Syria. Wars, and sectarian divisions, unchained in these countries, created chaos ISIS exploited. ISIS was able to control important territories by capturing key cities such as Raqqa and Mosul. They ran these areas like a government — set up systems to collect taxes, enforce laws, and provide services to make them more legitimate to their followers.
The success that ISIS had would not have been possible if it had not been propagated and recruited so effectively. Social media was conquered by the group, along with videos, magazines, and messages which it sent all over the world. They were supposed to magnify and attract people, namely young men and women. It worked well, and thousands of foreign fighters in ISIS joined from the far corners of the world. ISIS spread its ideas far beyond the Middle East. They also had put a lot of focus on getting financially independent. Unlike other terror groups, ISIS was raking in its own money. It sold oil, kidnapped people for ransom, looted ancient artifacts, and ran illegal businesses. This money helped ISIS buy weapons, train fighters, and keep its operation running. It also employed a combination of hit-and-run tactics and conventional warfare strategies in those areas to enable it to capture territories.
Despite their inability to control territory after military defeats by international coalitions, ISIS succeeded in gaining media attention of the world making it one of the most fruitful terror groups of the relatively new century. ISIS failed in its territorial expansion, yet the group has left its legacy and its online jihadi brigades are inspiring other jihadist organizations.
Transnational Crime Group: Sinaloa Cartel
Presently, the Sinaloa Cartel is one of the most successful and potent drug trafficking cartels in the global village. Founded in Mexico in the late 1980s, the cartel is leading the market for the provision of illicit substances to this day. Organized and led by Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, the Sinaloa Cartel consisted of its efficient ability to smuggle narcotics and other goods, enormous wealth accumulation, and more importantly the cartel’s capacity to continuously and consistently checkmate law enforcement and all forms of competitor cartels.
One of the major success factors has been the leadership /organization of the cartel. Cartel leaders incorporated strategies and made changes to the organization to provide a safety net to the structure as many Johnny say that the plans of Guzman and Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada were to develop a good system that could not be dismantled by arrests or infighting against other Cartels. Unlike the other criminal groups, the Sinaloa cartel is not centralized, in that it is not dominated by a single leader. This makes it more flexible and it cannot easily be dismantled. (Stern & Modi 2010).
Another factor that makes the cartel successful is the efficiency of its smuggling techniques. It employs subterranean passages, compartments in vehicles, aerial vehicles, and embezzled officials to traffic cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, Fentanyl, and other illicit substances across borders. The cartel also has other partners in criminality like Colombian drug manufacturing companies and European mafia to take its operations international. These partnerships help put the cartel’s drugs on the North American, European, and Asian markets.
Another reason that has boosted the cartel has been corruption. The major consequence of the operation, according to the Sinaloa Cartel, is that politicians, the police, and the military have been bribed to maintain the cartel’s trade. Due to this widespread corruption, the group cannot be arrested and all their supply routes remain open. At the same time, violence and the threat of violence are being employed by cartels in order to eliminate competitors and anyone otherwise posing a threat to the cartel’s dominance that preserves control over the key regions.
Another proof is the fact that the cartel also demonstrated a high level of flexibility. When the public moved to synthetic substances like fentanyl, the cartel also changed its supply and marketing considerably. After Guzman’s custom arrest and extradition to the United States, the cartel is still strong Since it has a robust cell structure and constantly diversifying. Today it remains the market leader in illicit drugs proving that it has evolved and adapted to new environments in law enforcement and the market. (Novogrodsky, 2018).
Examining ISIS and the Sinaloa Cartel
ISIS as well as the Sinaloa Cartel case proves that non-state groups with certain objectives can learn behaviors that will help them accomplish them. An important fact is that both groups actively used an unstable environment. ISIS seized the civil unrest in Iraq and Syria and the Sinaloa Cartel took advantage of corruption and ineffective police force in Mexico. Both also relied on innovative methods: ISIS relied on propaganda on social media to gain followers while the cartel built elaborate smuggling methods and product variety.
However, the aim and the plan of operation for both were different. ISIS sought to build a caliphate and bring in a new religious prosecution while the Sinaloa Cartel sought to earn black money by selling prohibited substances. It therefore became clear that the two entities had different objectives when it came to their long-term success. That is why ISIS made a big mistake trying to conquer territory: it was immediately targeted by military coalitions and defeated. Now in the hands of Sinaloa Cartel, which was always a greedier or profit-motivated gang, it was easy for them to be flexible and continue to exist even when they were suffering some of the worst high-profile hits.
References
Novogrodsky, N. B. (2018). Is ISIS a State: The Status of Statehood in the Age of Terror? Berkeley J. Int'l L., 36, 36.
Ryan, M. W. (2015). ISIS: The terrorist group that would be a state. United States Naval War College, Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups.
Stern, J., & Modi, A. (2010). Producing terror: organizational dynamics of survival. In Terrorism, Security and the Power of Informal Networks. Edward Elgar Publishing.
Part 2, question 8
Terror Group: Tamil Tigers or LTTE
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam, was a militant group in Sri Lanka. The group was formed in 1976 to create a separate Tamil state. Despite some military success, the LTTE was beaten by the Sri Lankan government in 2009. Their failure is explained widely because they were violent, lacked leadership, and no longer got international support. The major reasons that the LTTE failed was that they used extreme violence. They carried out suicide bombings, assassinations, and attacks on civilians. These methods helped in the short term but also led them to many problems. For example, in 1991 the LTTE assassinated Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi. The act was carried out against India which once supported the LTTE. On top of that, the LTTE’s attack on Sri Lankan civilians has also led Tamil people to distrust them, even if the LTTE claimed to fight for Tamil rights.
They also had leadership issues. Velupillai Prabhakaran, group founder and leader, made all the decisions — and there was no disagreement. His intransigence during negotiations for peace greatly reduced the chances that the group would obtain its objectives. At the same time, he miscalculated the Sri Lankan government's ability to fight back, placing the LTTE at risk while the military rolled out a full-scale offensive against them in the late 2000s.
Failure was also caused by a lack of international support. The focus after 9/11 was fighting terrorism. The LTTE was labeled a terrorist group by countries such as the United States and European nations. It restricted, therefore, the access of such Tamil communities settled abroad from money and weapons. If the LTTE hadn’t had this support, it would not have been able to sustain those operations.
However, the Sri Lankan government’s great military campaign beat the LTTE. The government spent money on modern weapons and worked with its intelligence agencies to break down the LTTE’s forces. In 2009, Prabhakaran was murdered in action and the Sri Lankan military took back all of LTTE-held areas. Their defeat came from a rigid structure that would not change to suit changing circumstances.
Transnational Crime Group: Cali Cartel
Cali Cartel is a Colombian drug trafficking organization that rose to power in the 1980s to the early 1990s. Cali Cartel, however, broke apart in the mid-1990s thanks to mounting pressure from law enforcement, changing leadership, and overbalancing pride in their operations. The Cali Cartel failed for one very big reason: it was corrupt. It used bribes to ensure it would not be prosecuted over its drug smuggling routes. It remained workable until international and Colombian authorities began to nail down drug trafficking. In an effort to tackle corruption, the U.S. government joined forces with Colombia to diminish the cartel's ability to keep its network of protected routes. (Gunaratna, 2002).
Overconfidence too was another reason. In the beginning, the Cali Cartel kept quiet and did not suffer the violence associated with the Medellin Cartel. But when the Cali Cartel began to grow its activities, authorities became more interested. It too diversified into legitimate businesses such as real estate and telecommunications, which made it easier for investigators to track its business.
The leadership problems also plagued Cali Cartel. Unlike the Medellin Cartel, which was run as an outfit by one man, the Cali Cartel had many—Gilberto and Miguel, and the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers were just the most important. That gave the cartel some room, but when the group came under pressure there were disagreements. The unity of the cartel started to slip away when one leader, José Santacruz, was arrested in 1995 and then killed.
They failed because there was no end to their determination, by Colombian and US authorities. A Colombian government 'Cornerstone' operation to dismantle the cartel was supported by the U.S. The operation hit leaders, the finances, and the routes of the cartel. The end of dominance of the cartel came in 1995 when the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers were arrested. Without leading from the front, the organization split, and smaller groups began to run it.
Comparing The Failures of the LTTE and the Cali Cartel
The LTTE and the Cali Cartel were bad guys from different walks of life, one a terror group with political aims, and the other a money-grubbing criminal group, but they failed for the same reasons. Both groups underestimated the ability of the other to defeat them. The LTTE was too reliant on violence, which marginally alienated local and international support, while the Cali Cartel grew too visible and too confident, making them all too easy to dismantle by law enforcement.
Both failures also included a role for leadership. Prabhakaran, the LTTE’s leader, would not budge or change course and the group was unprepared to make the next move when the Sri Lankan government ratcheted up its military campaign. Likewise, the Cali Cartels' decentralized and scattered leadership could not retain the unity once law enforcement took its aim.
Furthermore, both groups did not tailor their operations to changes. Post 9/11, international support dropped for the LTTE, and the Cali Cartel couldn’t become stealthy when there was increased surveillance and enforcement. (Ekici et al. 2008).
Conclusion
Tamil Tigers and Cali Cartel teach important lessons about why Non-State Organizations fail. Principal to that failure was the LTTEs reliance on violence, poor leadership, and lack of international support, leading to their military defeat. The dealings of the Cali Cartel were similarly dependent on corruption, internal disagreements, and the inability to fly below the radar, and were just as vulnerable to law enforcement being fired at them. The two cases suggest that even the most powerful groups can collapse when the employment of rigid strategies, problems with leadership, and inability to adapt to external pressure converge. Understanding the cause of these failures can be useful in designing strategies to stop any future organizations.
References
Ekici, N., Ozkan, M., Celik, A., & Maxfield, M. G. (2008). Outsmarting terrorists in Turkey. Crime Prevention and Community Safety, 10, 126-139.
Gunaratna, R. (2002). Inside Al Qaeda: a global network of terror. Columbia University Press.